Article 1 Belonging to the House of Representatives

Power of the Purse

Historical Highlight

"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the Firm of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or agree with amendments as on other Bills."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, department 7, clause 1

"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, only in Result of Appropriations made past Law; and a regular Statement and Business relationship of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall exist published from time to time."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, section nine, clause seven

/tiles/non-drove/i/i_origins_power_purse_approps_lc.xml Image courtesy of the Library of Congress The House Appropriations Committee in 1918 featuring (from left to right) hereafter Secretary of State James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, onetime Speaker Joseph Cannon of Illinois, Chairman J. Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, hereafter Speaker Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts, future Secretarial assistant of War James West. Good of Iowa, and future Speaker Joseph Byrns of Tennessee.

Congress—and in detail, the House of Representatives—is invested with the "power of the purse," the power to tax and spend public money for the national government. Massachusetts' Elbridge Gerry said at the Federal Constitutional Convention that the House "was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the purse-strings."

Origins

English history heavily influenced the Ramble framers. The British House of Eatables has the sectional correct to create taxes and spend that revenue, which is considered the ultimate bank check on majestic authority. Indeed, the American colonists' cry of "No taxation without representation!" referred to the injustice of London imposing taxes on them without the benefit of a vocalism in Parliament.

Constitutional Framing

Contend at the Constitutional Convention centered on two issues. The first was to ensure that the executive would not spend coin without congressional authorization. The second concerned the roles the House and Senate would play in setting fiscal policy.

At the Convention, the framers considered the extent to which the Senate—like the Business firm of Lords—should exist limited in its consideration of upkeep bills. The provision was part of a compromise betwixt the large and small states. Smaller states, which would exist over-represented in the Senate, would concede the power to originate money bills to the Firm, where states with larger populations would take greater control. Speaking in favor of the provision, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania said, "It was a maxim that those who feel, can best judge. This end would . . . be best attained, if coin affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people." The provision in the committee'south report to the Convention was adopted, 5 to 3, with three states divided on the question. The Convention reconsidered the matter over the course of two months, but the provision was finally adopted, nine to two, in September 1787.

The constitutional provision making Congress the ultimate authority on authorities spending passed with far less debate. The framers were unanimous that Congress, as the representatives of the people, should be in control of public funds—not the President or executive branch agencies. This strongly-held belief was rooted in the framers' experiences with England, where the male monarch had broad latitude over spending once the money had been raised.

The Early Appropriations Process

The First Congress (1789–1791) passed the first appropriations act—a mere 13 lines long—a few months subsequently it convened. The law funded the authorities, including important pensions for Revolutionary War veterans, with but $639,000—an amount in the tens of millions in existent terms. This simple process was short-lived. Over time, 9 regular appropriation bills emerged and funded such priorities as pensions, harbors, the post office, and the military. These were considered on an annual basis by the late 1850s. The Firm Committee on Means and Means, which besides had jurisdiction over taxation policy, controlled the appropriations process. But legislation and funding were ever kept split up. Priorities were spelled out in 1 law and money appropriated for those priorities in another. This has remained the practice, as substantive committees blueprint authorization acts and the House and Senate Cribbing Committees fund authorized programs subsequently. Indeed, there are laws and parliamentary rules against making new law in appropriation bills, although such rules are periodically waived.

Subsequent Reforms

In 1865, after the Ceremonious War had created a nearly $3 billion national debt and spending exceeded a billion dollars a twelvemonth, Congress reformed its funding process to handle the government's new demands. The House separated the Ways and Means Commission's taxing and spending functions. The Appropriations Committee was established to fund programs, while Means and Means retained jurisdiction on tax policy. House leadership and other committees also tried to influence the appropriations process, and the lack of coordination over the years led to high deficits and the implementation of the federal income revenue enhancement in 1913. Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act in 1921 to address some of the coordination problems it faced funding government programs. This law centralized many of the budgeting functions with the President, who still has considerable agenda-setting power with the federal upkeep and submits a typhoon budget to Congress at the outset of every year. The appropriations process has been reformed multiple times since 1921, including notable restructurings with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Command Act of 1974 and the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Acts of 1985 and 1987.

For Farther Reading

Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. 4 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Printing, 1937).

Garfield, James. "National Appropriations and Misappropriations," Due north American Review, 270: 572–586.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

Kimmel, Lewis. Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy, 1789–1958. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1959).

Leloup, Lance. The Fiscal Congress. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980).

Schick, Allen. Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Constitute, 1980).

—. The Federal Upkeep: Politics, Policy, Process. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).

Selko, Daniel. The Federal Fiscal System. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1940).

Stewart, Charles H., Iii. Budget Reform Politics: The Pattern of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865–1921. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Wildavsky, Aaron B. Budgeting and Governing. (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006).

—. The New Politics of the Budgetary Procedure. fifth ed. (New York: Longman, 2003).

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Source: https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Power-of-the-Purse/

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